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Stalin,	the	Western	Allies	and	Soviet	policy	towards	the	Yugoslav	partisan	movement	
1941-1944	
	
Soviet	policy	towards	the	Yugoslav	partisans	has	rarely	been	explored	as	a	subject	in	its	
own	right,	and	almost	never	in	terms	of	its	development	across	the	entire	period	between	
1941	and	1944.1	It	has	been	often	used,	rather,	as	a	litmus	test	to	shed	light	on	related	and	
broader	topics.		
Yugoslav	historiography	has	been	traditionally	concerned	to	emphasise	the	autonomy	of	
Tito’s	revolution,	and	consequently	to	play	down	support	received	from	Moscow.	According	
to	this	narrative,	Stalin	was	determined	to	sacrifice	revolutionary	ambition	on	the	part	of	the	
European	communist	parties	on	the	altar	of	Soviet	interests.	Tito,	by	contrast,	aimed	to	turn	
the	war	of	liberation	in	Yugoslavia	into	a	struggle	to	establish	a	new	socialist	state	or,	looking	
at	the	issue	from	a	different	angle,	to	pursue	the	interests	of	his	country	even	if	they	did	not	
fit	with	those	of	the	Soviet	Union.	To	support	its	claims,	this	historiography	focused	mainly	
on	the	1941-1943	period,	when	the	contrast	between	Stalin	and	Tito	seemed	most	obviously	
apparent.	Lacking	appropriate	Soviet	records,	this	interpretation,	which	seemed	vindicated	
by	the	1948	split,	also	set	the	tone	for	many	of	the	Western	accounts	which	followed.2	
Due	 to	 the	 disbandment	 of	 the	 Comintern	 in	 1943,	 historians	 of	 the	 international	
communist	movement	with	access	to	Russian	documents	also	paid	less	attention	to	1943-44	
which,	 as	 far	 as	 Yugoslavia	 is	 concerned,	 remained	 in	 a	 sort	 of	 historiographical	 limbo	
between	the	Second	World	War	and	the	Cold	War.3	Those	accounts	that,	by	contrast,	took	a	
																																																						
1	The	only	relevant	exception	in	English	is	the	unpublished	P.	Jukic,	Uncommon	Cause:	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	
Rise	of	Tito's	Yugoslavia,	1941-1945	(A	Dissertation	Presented	to	the	Graduate	School	of	Yale	University	1997).	
Russian	historiography	paid	comparatively	more	attention	to	the	topic	both	through	research	contributions	and	
collections	of	documents.	See	for	example	A.B.	Edemskii,	‘Moskva	i	Antifashistskoe	Dvizhenie	I.	Broz	Tito	(Ianvar'	
-	Nachalo	Oktiabria	1944	g.)’,	in	Oslobodjenje	Beograda	1944	Godine.	Zbornik	Radova	(Belgrade	2010),	95-129,	
A.M.	 Sergienko,	Okazanie	 Sovetskim	 Soiuzom	Voenno-Tekhnicheskoi	 i	 Kadrovoi	 Pomoshchi	 Iugoslavii	 v	 Gody	
Vtoroi	Mirovoi	 Voiny	 (Вelgorod	 2007),	Russkii	 Arkhiv:	 Velikaia	 Otechestvennaia.	 Krasnaia	 Armiia	 v	 Stranakh	
Tsentral'noi,	Severnoi	Evropy.	Dokumenty	i	Materialy.	1944-1945		(Moscow	2000)	and	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	
s	Iugoslaviei	1941-1945	gg.	Dokumenty	i	Materialy		(Moscow	1998).	
2	Among	the	most	influential	works	conveying	this	view	which	have	been	translated	are	V.	Dedijer,	Tito	Speaks:	
his	Self	Portrait	and	Struggle	with	Stalin	(London	1953),	M.	Djilas,	Conversations	with	Stalin	(New	York	1962)	and	
M.	 Djilas,	Wartime	 (New	 York,	 NY;	 London	 1977).	 This	 approach	 is	 largely	 reflected	 in	 the	most	 important	
collection	of	documents	on	the	topic	published	in	English,	S.	Clissold	(ed.)	Yugoslavia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	1939-
1973:	a	Documentary	Survey	(London;	New	York,	NY	1975).		
3	See	F.I.	Firsov,	H.	Klehr,	and	J.E.	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	Comintern,	1933-1943	(New	Haven,	CT	2014),	
M.M.	Narinski	and	N.S.	Lebedeva	(eds.)	Komintern	i	Vtoraia	Mirovaia	Voina,	Chast'	 II,	posle	22	Iiunia	1941	g.	
(Moscow	1998)	and,	specifically	on	Yugoslavia,	G.	Swain,	‘Tito	and	the	Twilight	of	the	Comintern’,	in	T.	Rees	and	
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long-term	view,	generally	refer	to	Soviet	policy	towards	Tito	when	dealing	with	the	immediate	
June	1941	period,	while	for	1944	more	emphasis	is	given	to	the	directives	issued	to	the	French	
and	the	Communist	parties,	or	to	the	events	surrounding	the	outbreak	of	the	Greek	civil	war.4		
The	question	of	Soviet	policy	has	been	recently	re-addressed	from	the	point	of	view	of	
Tito’s	 biography.	 In	 this	 context,	 more	 coverage	 has	 been	 given	 to	 events	 post-Teheran,	
stressing	that	Moscow’s	readiness	to	support	Tito	increased	significantly	once	Stalin	realised	
that	this	did	not	put	him	on	a	collision	course	with	the	British.5	But	this	focus	upon	Tito	means	
that	 the	 extent	 of	 Soviet	 involvement	has	 been	 largely	 neglected,	 as	 also	 internal	 debate	
within	 the	 Soviet	 camp,	 which	 shaped	 the	 formulation	 of	 Soviet	 policy	 during	 the	 entire	
course	of	the	war.		
	
This	 article	 follows	 the	 development	 of	 Soviet	 policy	 towards	 the	 communist	 partisan	
movement	from	the	invasion	of	Yugoslavia	in	1941	to	the	liberation	of	the	country	at	the	end	
of	1944.	In	doing	so,	 it	aims	to	address	this	topic	for	the	first	time	through	the	lens	of	the	
Soviet	decision	making	process,	following	its	development	across	the	entire	duration	of	the	
war.	During	1941-1942,	the	Comintern	was	indeed	concerned	by	Tito’s	leftist	stand,	although	
this	did	not	prevent	Moscow	recognizing	his	role	as	one	of	the	key	players	in	the	region.	Over	
the	 course	 of	 the	 war,	 the	 strict	 popular	 front	 strategy	 imposed	 on	 Tito	 in	 1941	 was	
progressively	abandoned	as	a	response	to	shifts	in	British	policy	and,	in	1944,	Moscow	gave	
full	support	to	the	partisans’	take-over	of	the	country.	The	Soviet	attitude	towards	Tito	was	
also	appreciably	adapted	as	he	changed	from	secretary	of	one	of	the	parties	subordinated	to	
the	Comintern	into	the	leader	of	a	new	communist	state	in	the	making.	The	development	of	
the	Soviet	policy,	however,	was	not	linear.	On	the	contrary,	it	took	shape	in	the	context	of	
many	uncertainties	and	steps	back	caused	by	a	lack	of	understanding	of	the	British	position,	
the	attempt	to	deceive	the	Western	Allies	about	the	extent	of	relations	with	Tito,	and	also	by	
the	emergence	of	different	perspectives	amongst	the	Soviet	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs,	the	
Comintern	and	 the	Soviet	military.	The	Soviets	were	 largely	 successful	 in	 their	attempt	 to	
																																																						
A.	Thorpe	(eds.)	International	Communism	and	the	Communist	International,	1919-43	(Manchester;	New	York,	
NY	1998),	205-21.	
4	For	example	S.	Pons,	The	Global	Revolution:	a	History	of	International	Communism,	1917-1991	(Oxford	2014),	
102-43.	
5	G.	Swain,	Tito:	a	Biography	 (London;	New	York	2011),	57-82	and	J.	Pirjevec,	Tito	e	 i	suoi	Compagni	 (Torino	
2015),	142-55.		
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support	Tito	whilst	avoiding	repercussions	for	the	Great	Alliance,	although	in	the	long	term	
their	achievements	backfired.	
	
The	 fire	 of	 resistance	 swept	 through	 Yugoslavia	 after	 the	 country	was	 invaded	by	 the	
Germans	in	April	1941.	Repression	at	the	hands	of	the	nominally	independent	State	of	Croatia	
established	by	the	Germans	caused	the	first	spontaneous	insurrection	of	the	Serbs,	who	acted	
largely	 in	 self-defence	and	with	 little	 coordination	between	disparate	 groups	of	 rebels.	 In	
Serbia,	 by	 contrast,	 the	 resistance	 found	 a	 nucleus	 of	 organization	 developing	 around	
Dragoljub	Mihailović	and	a	group	of	Serbian	officers	who	refused	to	accept	the	surrender.	The	
British,	who	 at	 that	 point	were	 short	 of	 good	 news,	 hailed	Mihailović	 as	 the	 hero	 of	 the	
European	resistance	and	inflated	his	accomplishments	‘to	legendary	proportions’.6	
In	Yugoslavia,	as	everywhere	across	Europe,	the	communists	joined	the	resistance	only	
after	 the	 German	 invasion	 of	 June	 1941.	 Stalin’s	 long-term	 vision	 remained	 fixed	 on	 the	
expected	showdown	between	socialist	and	capitalist	forces	that	was	at	the	root	of	the	Marxist	
worldview,	but	the	Comintern’s	policy	was	reoriented,	reverting	to	the	popular	front	tactics	
of	the	Thirties.	In	the	wartime	context,	this	meant	that	communist	groups	were	mobilized	to	
organize	mass	resistance	movements	against	the	Nazis,	putting	aside	revolutionary	slogans	
and	collaborating	with	other	opposition	movements.7		
As	instructed	by	Moscow,	after	June	1941	Tito	mobilized	the	Yugoslav	communist	party	
for	an	all-out	war	against	the	occupiers.8	But	he	also	made	it	clear	that	he	considered	the	
struggle	against	the	occupiers	as	a	struggle	for	the	triumph	of	Socialism.	 In	mid-August	he	
claimed	 that	 the	 Chetniks	 were	 fighting	 against	 the	 Partisans	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	
																																																						
6	S.	Pavlowitch,	Hitler's	New	Disorder:	the	Second	World	War	in	Yugoslavia	(New	York,	NY	2008),	64	and	S.	Trew,	
Britain,	Mihailovic	and	the	Chetniks,	1941-42	(New	York	1998),	36-38.	Accounts	of	the	Chetnik	movement	during	
the	war	available	in	English	include	L.	Karchmar,	Draža	Mihailović	and	the	Rise	of	the	Četnik	Movement,	1941-
1942	(New	York,	NY;	London	1987),	M.	Milazzo,	The	Chetnik	Movement	and	the	Yugoslav	Resistance	(Baltimore	
1975),	 J.	 Tomasevich,	The	Chetniks	 (Stanford,	CA	1975).	The	development	of	 the	Chetnik-Partisan	conflict	 in	
Bosnia	 is	covered	by	M.A.	Hoare,	Genocide	and	Resistance	 in	Hitler's	Bosnia:	 the	Partisans	and	the	Chetniks,	
1941-1943	(Oxford;	New	York,	NY	2006).		
7	On	Comintern’s	policy	after	June	1941	Pons,	The	Global	Revolution,	102-43,	Firsov,	Klehr,	and	Haynes,	Secret	
Cables	of	the	Comintern,	184-237,	E.	Mark,	Revolution	by	Degrees:	Stalin’s	National-Front	Strategy	for	Europe,	
1941-1947	(Washington,	DC	2001)	and	Narinski	and	Lebedeva	(eds.)	Komintern	i	Vtoraia	Mirovaia	Voina,	Chast'	
II,	posle	22	Iiunia	1941	g.	
8	Accounts	of	the	Partisan	movement	in	Yugoslavia	tend	to	coincide	with	bibliographies	of	Tito.	Among	the	more	
recent	are	Pirjevec,	Tito	e	i	suoi	Compagni	and	Swain,	Tito:	a	Biography.	An	updated	account	of	the	events	in	
Yugoslavia	during	the	war	that	pays	special	attention	to	the	resistance	movements	is	L.I.	Gibianskii,	‘Iugoslaviia	
v	Period	Vtoroi	Mirovoi	Voiny’,	in	K.V.	Nikiforov	(ed)	Iugoslaviia	v	XX	Veke:	Ocherki	Politicheskoi	Istorii	(Moscow	
2011),	305-522.	
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Germans,9	and	started	urging	Dimitrov	to	send	weapons,	pointing	out	that	this	would	have	
‘huge	political	significance	in	the	future’.10	Under	the	impression	that	the	Red	Army	would	
quickly	 repel	 the	 German	 attack	 and	 advance	 through	 the	 Balkans,	 in	 September	 Tito	
established	his	headquarters	in	the	city	of	Užice,	in	western	Serbia.	Here	he	set	up	a	system	
of	 government	 under	 the	 strict	 control	 of	 the	 party,	 destroying	 tax	 and	 land	 records,	
introducing	communist	symbols	and	getting	rid	of	real	or	imaginary	“enemies	of	the	people”.	
At	 the	 beginning	 of	 November,	 the	 Partisans	 celebrated	 the	 anniversary	 of	 the	 October	
Revolution,	and	in	22	December,	the	day	of	Stalin’s	birthday,	created	the	first	“proletarian	
brigade”.11	 There	 was	 clearly	 no	 possible	 middle	 ground	 between	 the	 Chetniks	 and	 the	
communists,	and	at	the	beginning	of	November	the	country	was	engulfed	in	a	civil	war.			
The	British	had	little	leverage	over	the	situation.	Their	first	attempt	was	thus	to	appeal	to	
the	Soviets,	along	with	the	Yugoslav	government,	 in	the	hope	that	they	might	 instruct	the	
communist	groups	to	subordinate	to	Mihailović.		
At	the	end	of	1941	the	importance	of	Tito’s	movement	was	already	clear	to	Dimitrov	who,	
starting	 from	 September,	 pushed	Molotov	 to	 send	military	 supplies	 to	 Yugoslavia.12	 	 The	
Comintern,	which	at	that	point	had	no	connections	with	the	Greek	communist	party,	was	also	
ready	 to	acknowledge	 the	key	 role	 that	Tito	might	play	 in	 the	entire	 region:	 the	Albanian	
communist	party	was	created	in	November	under	Yugoslav	patronage,	and	a	dispute	with	the	
Bulgarian	party	over	the	jurisdiction	of	Macedonia	had	already	been	resolved	in	favour	of	the	
Yugoslavs	in	August	1941.	Contacts	with	the	Italian	communist	party	were	also	maintained	
through	 Yugoslavia.13	 The	 situation	was	 such,	 however,	 that	 any	 public	 stand	 in	 the	 Tito-
Mihailović	controversy	was	not	considered	advisable,	and	Moscow	refused	to	commit	itself	
with	the	British.		
																																																						
9	Radiogramma	General’nogo	Secretaria	KPIu	I.	Broz	Tito	Ispolnitel’nomu	Komitetu	Kominterna,	13.8.1941,	 in	
Otnoshenija	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Jugoslaviej	1941-1945	gg.	Dokumenty	i	materialy		(Moscow	1998),	61.	
10	Radiogramma	General’nogo	Secretaria	KPIu	I	Broz	Tito	Ispolnitel’nomu	Komitetu	Kominterna,	[beginning	of	
October	1941],	in	ibid.,	70.	
11	Swain,	Tito:	a	Biography,	38-40	and	Pavlowitch,	Hitler's	New	Disorder,	62.	
12	Molotov,	however,	made	it	immediately	clear	that	this	was	impossible	because	the	needs	were	‘enormous’	
and	Moscow	would	have	to	compensate	‘for	great	losses’	I.	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	1933-1949	
(New	Haven	2003),	8.9.1941,	193.	
13	B.	Fischer,	Albania	at	War,	1939-1945	(London	1999),	123-25,	S.	Palmer	and	R.	King,	Yugoslav	Communism	
and	the	Macedonian	Question	 (Hamden,	CT	1971),	66-68	and	Firsov,	Klehr,	and	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	
Comintern,	201-2.	
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On	the	one	hand,	the	Soviets,	who	in	September	1941	were	contemplating	sending	a	joint	
mission	 to	 Mihailović	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 British,14	 were	 unsure	 about	 what	 was	
happening	in	the	country.	At	the	end	of	November	the	secretary	of	the	Comintern,	Dimitrov,	
asked	Tito	who	was	leading	the	Chetniks	and	which	relation	did	they	have	with	the	Partisans.15	
When	 Tito	 replied	 that	 they	 were	 just	 collaborators	 of	 the	 Germans,	 Moscow	 appeared	
unconvinced,	suspecting	that	it	was	Tito	who	was	not	doing	enough	to	achieve	collaboration	
with	other	antifascist	forces.	A	few	months	later	Dimitrov	was	still	insisting	to	Tito	that	it	was	
hard	 to	 imagine	 that	 ‘London	and	 the	Yugoslav	government	 support	 the	occupiers’,	 as	he	
claimed,	and	that	the	issues	with	the	Chetniks	‘must	be	a	big	misunderstanding’.16		
On	the	other	hand,	Moscow	was	clearly	concerned	that	the	leftist	line	adopted	by	Tito	
could	damage	its	relations	with	both	the	Yugoslav	government-in-exile	and	the	British.	Yet	
the	 possibility	 for	 the	 Soviets	 to	 appease	 the	 British	 by	 publicly	 pushing	 Tito	 towards	 a	
conciliatory	 course	 was	 limited,	 paradoxically,	 by	 Moscow’s	 claim	 that	 the	 European	
communist	 parties	 were	 not	 the	 “long	 arm”	 of	 Moscow.17	 When,	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
December	 1941,	 the	 British	 incorrectly	 notified	 them	 that	 the	 Chetniks	 had	 reached	 an	
agreement	with	 the	Partisans,	 the	 Soviets	 could	not	dispute	 this	 information,	 as	 to	do	 so	
would	imply	that	Moscow	had	a	direct	link	with	the	Partisans	or	at	least	a	link	to	independent	
sources	inside	the	country.	Moscow	simply	replied	that	it	did	not	consider	it	advisable	for	the	
Soviet	government	to	intervene	in	Yugoslav	internal	affairs,18	leaving	the	British	to	deal	with	
the	mess	by	themselves.		
	
At	the	beginning	of	1942,	it	was	difficult	to	see	how	the	Soviets	could	square	the	circle	of	
three	apparently	incompatible	goals:	supporting	Tito,	avoiding	the	repercussions	of	this	policy	
																																																						
14	M.	Deroc,	British	Special	Operations	Explored:	Yugoslavia	in	Turmoil	1941-1943	and	the	British	Response	(New	
York,	NY	1988),	 194-204.	 See	also	M.	Wheeler,	 ‘Resistance	 from	Abroad.	Anglo-Soviet	 Efforst	 to	Coordinate	
Yugoslav	 Resistance,	 1941-42’,	 in	M.	 Seaman	 (ed.)	 Special	 Operations	 Executive:	 a	 New	 Instrument	 of	War	
(London;	New	York	2006),	103-22.	
15	Firsov,	Klehr,	and	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	Comintern,	194-95.	
16	Dimitrov	to	Stalin	and	Others,	5	and	6	March	1942,	doc.	45	in	A.	Dallin	and	F.I.	Firsov,	Dimitrov	and	Stalin,	
1934-1943:	Letters	from	the	Soviet	Archives	(New	Haven,	CT;	London	2000),	217.	
17	Back	in	April	1941	the	Kremlin	was	already	concerned	that	the	formal	affiliation	of	the	communist	parties	with	
the	 Comintern	 might	 represent	 an	 obstacle	 both	 for	 the	 development	 of	 the	 parties	 and	 for	 Moscow’s	
international	 relations,	 and	 started	discussing	 the	 advisability	 of	 disbanding	 it.	 See	Banac	 (ed.)	The	Diary	 of	
Georgi	Dimitrov,	20.4.1941,	155-56	and	Firsov,	Klehr,	and	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	Comintern,	238-39.	
18	Pamiatnaia	 Zapiska	 NKID	 SSSR	 Posol’stvu	 v	 Velikobritanii	 v	 SSSR,	 5.1.1942,	 in	Otnoshenija	 Rossii	 (SSSR)	 s	
Jugoslaviej	1941-1945	gg.,	90.	The	first	draft	of	this	document,	which	disputed	British	information,	in	Archive	of	
Foreign	Policy	of	the	Russian	Federation	[AVP	RF],	f.	06,	o.	4,	p.	14,	d.	141,	l.4.		
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for	relations	with	the	British	when	their	help	was	more	needed	than	ever,	and	sustaining	the	
pretence	that	they	had	no	control	over	the	Yugoslav	communist	party.	Tito,	however,	found	
a	champion	of	his	cause	in	Moscow	in	Dimitrov.	
Dimitrov’s	first	goal	was	to	bring	Tito	in	line	with	the	Comintern’s	official	position.	On	5	
March	1942	he	accused	Tito	of	giving	grounds	‘for	the	supporters	of	England	and	the	Yugoslav	
government’	to	suspect	that	the	partisan	movement	was	‘acquiring	a	communist	character	
and	 [was]	 aiming	 at	 the	 Sovietisation	 of	 Yugoslavia’.	 The	 secretary	 of	 the	 Comintern		
instructed	him	to	 ‘seriously	review	[his]	tactics	and	activities’,	and	reminded	him	that	 ‘the	
main	task	[was]	to	unite	all	the	anti-Hitler	elements	in	order	to	defeat	the	occupiers’.19		
Tito	had	good	reasons	to	comply.	The	distance	between	him	and	the	Soviet	 leadership	
was,	 at	 its	 roots,	 strategic,	 arising	 out	 of	 the	 eternal	 debate	 inside	 the	 international	
communist	movement	 about	 the	 correct	 route	 to	 establish	 socialism.	But	 negotiating	 the	
turbulent	politics	of	the	1930s	in	the	Moscow	of	the	Great	Purge	had	taught	Tito	the	limits	of	
his	ability	to	manoeuvre,	and	especially	that,	to	operate	freely	in	internal	politics,	he	had	to	
pay	lip	service	to	the	Soviet	line	in	the	international	arena.20	He	also	realized	that	his	ultra-
radical	line	could	alienate	a	vast	part	of	the	population.	In	April,	the	leadership	of	the	party	
increased	 its	 campaign	 against	 ‘sectarianism’	 and,	 under	 Soviet	 guidance,	 began	 a	 slow	
process	of	ideological	reorganization	under	the	guidance	of	Dimitrov.21		
At	the	same	time,	Dimitrov	started	lobbying	Molotov	and	Stalin	in	favour	of	the	Yugoslav	
comrades,	claiming	that	the	British	and	the	government-in-exile	were	obstructing	the	anti-
German	effort	of	the	resistance	movement	and	urging	the	Soviet	leadership	to	send	weapons	
to	the	Partisans.22	The	Soviet	government,	however,	was	uncertain	as	to	how	to	proceed.	As	
Andrey	Vyshinskii,	then	Molotov’s	deputy,	commented	on	19	June	1942,	 it	was	difficult	to	
keep	 the	 question	 of	 the	 Partisans	 separated	 from	 its	 context,	 and	 especially	 from	 the	
problem	of	relations	with	the	government-in-exile.	If	Moscow	were	to	address	this	issue,	he	
wrote,	‘it	will	be	necessary	to	carry	the	matter	through	to	the	end’.	‘Truthfully’,	he	concluded,	
																																																						
19	Dimitrov	to	Stalin	and	Others,	5	and	6	March	1942,	doc.	45	in	Dallin	and	Firsov,	Dimitrov	and	Stalin,	1934-
1943:	Letters	from	the	Soviet	Archives,	217.	
20	G.	Swain,	‘Tito:	the	Formation	of	a	Disloyal	Bolshevik’,	International	Journal	of	Social	History,	XXXIV	(1989),	
270-71	and	Swain,	‘Tito	and	the	Twilight	of	the	Comintern’,	205-21.	
21	Swain,	Tito:	a	Biography,	41-46	and	Pirjevec,	Tito	e	i	suoi	Compagni,	109-10.	
22	 Pis’mo	 G.	 Dimitrova	 I.	 Stalinu	 ob	 Otnoshenii	 Angliiskogo	 i	 Iugoslavskogo	 Pravitel’stva	 k	 Partizanskomu	
Dvizheniiu	v.	Iugoslavii,	28.4.1942,	in	Narinski	and	Lebedeva	(eds.)	Komintern	i	Vtoraia	Mirovaia	Voina,	Chast'	II,	
posle	22	Iiunia	1941	g.,	214-15	and	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	4.6.1942,	221.	
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‘I	do	not	see	such	a	possibility’.23	Molotov,	moreover,	was	still	not	fully	convinced	by	Tito’s	
accusations	against	Mihailović,	which	seemed	to	him	‘simplified	and	one-sided’.24		
It	took	Dimitrov	making	an	extra	effort	with	Tito	for	Moscow	to	start	considering	a	new	
position.	At	the	beginning	of	June,	while	Soviet	representatives	in	London	were	claiming	that	
Moscow	had	no	connections	with	Yugoslavia	and	bore	no	responsibility	for	the	actions	of	the	
Comintern,25	Dimitrov	delivered	a	 lesson	 in	popular-front	 tactics	 to	Tito.	The	Partisans,	he	
explained,	were	right	to	expose	the	activities	of	the	Chetniks,	but	this	should	not	be	presented	
as	an	attack	on	the	Yugoslav	government,	but	rather	as	an	appeal	to	it,	‘emphasizing	that	the	
fighting	 Yugoslav	 patriots	 are	 entitled	 to	 expect	 that	 government’s	 support’.	 Part	 of	 the	
Chetniks,	he	argued,	should	be	won	over,	others	neutralized	and	only	 ‘the	most	malicious	
part	of	 them’	destroyed	 ‘without	mercy’.	He	believed	 that	 the	campaign	against	 the	class	
enemy	should	be	conducted	in	the	name	of	unity,	without	giving	the	impression	that	it	was	
party	oriented.	He	therefore	considered	 it	expedient	 to	organize	some	form	of	appeal	 ‘by	
well-known	Yugoslav	public	figures	and	politicians	against	collaborators	and	in	favour	of	the	
Part[isan]	people’s	liberation	army’,	and	possibly	also	to	set	up	a	‘national	committee	for	aid	
for	 the	Yugoslav	people’s	war	of	 liberation’	with	the	participation	of	 ‘well-known	patriotic	
Serb,	 Croat,	Montenegrin,	 and	 Slovene	 public	 figures’.26	 Tito	 took	 notice.	On	 16	 June,	 he	
summoned	a	‘Congress	of	Patriots	from	Montenegro,	the	Bay	of	Kotor	and	Sandžak’	which	
issued	a	declaration	that	did	not	refer	to	the	communist	organization,	but	praised	the	three	
big	powers	and	made	an	appeal	to	the	Yugoslav	government-in-exile	instead	of	attacking	it.27	
A	few	days	later,	on	19	June,	he	made	a	speech	that	all	but	abandoned	the	leftist	tone	of	his	
previous	statements	and	condemned	the	‘sectarianism’	of	the	party.28	
	
																																																						
23	From	Vyshinskii	to	Dekanozov,	19.6.1942,	in	AVP	RF,	f.	06,	o.	4,	p.	26,	d.	292,	l.	93	and	Jukic,	Uncommon	Cause,	
260.	
24	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	24.7.1942,	232.	
25	For	example	Zapis’	besedy	Prem’er-Ministra	Iugoslavskogo	Pravitel’stva	v	Emigratsii	C.	Iovanovich	s	Poslom	
SSSR	 pri	 Soiuznykh	 Pravitel’stvakh	 v	 Londone	 A.E.	 Bogomolovym,	 16.5.1942	 and	 Iz	 Doneseniia	 Posla	 SSSR	 v	
Velikobritanii	I.M.	Maiskogo	v	NKID	SSSR,	28.7.1942,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	117-18	and	127.	
26	Banac	 (ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	1.6.1942,	220-21.	The	 importance	of	 this	directive	 for	Yugoslav-
Soviet	relations	is	stressed	by	Jukic,	Uncommon	Cause,	233.	
27		Jukic,	Uncommon	Cause,	251-52.		
28	Swain,	Tito:	a	Biography,	47	and	Gibianskii,	‘Iugoslaviia	v	Period	Vtoroi	Mirovoi	Voiny’,	428.	
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The	decision	to	take	a	public	stand	in	Yugoslav	affairs	was	finally	agreed	between	Molotov	
and	Dimitrov	at	the	end	of	July.29	It	was	the	result	of	several	factors:	the	new	line	adopted	by	
Tito,	increasing	reports	of	collaboration	between	Mihailović	and	the	Italians,	and	the	British	
veto	of	the	conclusion	of	a	treaty	between	Moscow	and	the	Yugoslav	government-in-exile	as	
proposed	by	the	Soviet	government.30		
Beginning	in	August	1942,	the	new	Soviet	course	towards	Yugoslavia	developed	in	three	
directions.	Firstly,	on	3	August,	a	carefully	worded	memorandum	that	accused	the	Chetniks	
of	fighting	the	Partisans	in	collaboration	with	the	occupiers	was	presented	to	the	ambassador	
of	the	Yugoslav	government-in-exile	in	London.31		
Secondly,	Moscow	kept	diplomatic	contacts	with	the	Yugoslav	government	on	a	different	
track	 and,	 at	 the	 end	 of	 August,	 it	 expressed	 a	 desire	 to	 elevate	 relations	 to	 the	 level	 of	
establishing	an	embassy.	Tito	protested	vehemently.32	At	the	end	of	November,	much	to	the	
surprise	of	the	Yugoslavs,	Moscow	also	offered	to	send	a	military	mission	to	establish	direct	
contact	with	Mihailović.33		
Thirdly,	Dimitrov	maintained	a	watchful	eye	over	Tito	to	ensure	that	he	stayed	on	track.	
A	few	days	after	the	memorandum	against	Mihailović	was	handed	to	the	Yugoslavs,	Dimitrov	
instructed	Tito	not	to	call	his	brigades	‘proletarian’	but	rather	‘shock	brigades’	and	urged	him	
to	understand	that	this	had	‘enormous	political	significance,	both	for	consolidating	people’s	
forces	against	the	occupiers	and	collaborators	within	the	country	and	for	foreign	countries’.	
Dimitrov	 also	 reminded	 him	 that	 he	 was	 waging	 a	 people’s	 liberation	 war	 and	 not	 a	
‘proletarian	struggle’,	and	that	he	should	‘quit	playing	right	into	the	hands	of	the	enemies	of	
the	people,	who	will	always	make	vicious	use	of	any	such	lapses	on	your	part’.34	The	haggling	
																																																						
29	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	29.7.1942,	233.	
30	The	agreement	was	vetoed	by	the	British	out	of	concern	that	 in	 the	 form	proposed	by	the	Soviets,	which	
covered	also	the	post-war	period,	it	could	create	a	precedent	for	the	other	governments	in	exile	to	ask	for	similar	
guarantees.	Yugoslav-Soviet	relation,	R3643,	in	National	Archives	[NA],	FO	371/33490.	
31	Pamiatnaia	Zapiska	NKID	SSSR	Iugoslavskoi	Missii	v	SSSR,	3.8.1942,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	
130-31.	The	Soviets	were	concerned	that	the	accusations	did	not	appear	to	originate	from	the	Communist	side:	
significantly,	when	Molotov	and	Dimitrov	agreed	on	 the	 content	of	 the	memorandum,	 they	 also	decided	 to	
retort	to	the	expected	Yugoslav	objections	with	the	declaration	at	the	Congress	of	16	June.	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	
of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	29.7.1942,	233.	
32	Radiogramma	General’nogo	Secretaria	KPIu	I.	Broz	Tito	Ispolnitel’nomu	Komitetu	Kominterna,	8-9.9.1942,	in	
Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	138-39.	
33	 The	offer	was	 rejected	by	 the	Yugoslavs,	who	 insisted	on	a	 cessation	of	 the	Soviet	propaganda	campaign	
against	the	Chetniks.	Clissold	(ed.)	Yugoslavia	and	the	Soviet	Union,	140.	
34	Paslanie	G.	Dimitrova	Val’teru	(I.	Tito)	i	F.	Birku	(E.	Kardeliu)	o	“Proletarskikh	Brigadakh”,	8.8.1942,	in	Narinski	
and	Lebedeva	(eds.)	Komintern	i	Vtoraia	Mirovaia	Voina,	Chast'	II,	posle	22	Iiunia	1941	g.,	248	and	in	English	
translation	in	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	10.8.1942,	234.	
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continued	for	the	rest	of	1942.	When,	in	November,	Tito	informed	Moscow	that	he	intended	
to	form	‘something	like	a	government’,	Dimitrov	urged	him	not	to	give	to	this	organization	a	
partisan	character,	asking	for	the	abolition	of	the	monarchy	or	attacking	the	Government-in-
exile	with	which	the	Soviet	Union	had	treaty	relations.35	Again,	Tito	complied.	When,	at	the	
end	of	November,	he	created	the	Anti-Fascist	Council	for	the	National	Liberation	of	Yugoslavia	
(AVNOJ),	he	gave	to	it	a	very	broad	programme,	with	which	almost	everybody	could	identify.		
The	result	of	Moscow’s	intervention	in	Yugoslav	affairs	was	the	stalling	of	Soviet	policies.	
The	British	military	was	increasingly	unhappy	with	Mihailović,	who	was	both	refraining	from	
any	anti-Axis	activity	in	order	to	avoid	German	reprisals	on	the	population	and	in	Montenegro	
had	focused	on	fighting	the	Partisans	in	a	“marriage	of	interest”	with	the	Italians.	The	Foreign	
Office	was	also	worried	about	the	repercussions	of	its	policy	for	Moscow.	But	the	immediate	
support	given	to	the	Chetnik	movement	by	the	Yugoslav	government	limited	the	options	at	
British	 disposal,	 and	 the	 Foreign	 Office	 rallied	 behind	 it	 to	 defend	 Mihailović.	 As	 a	
consequence,	when	the	Yugoslavs	presented	a	counter	memorandum	rebuffing	the	Soviet	
accusations,	Moscow	was	unable	to	take	the	affair	further	without	creating	a	breach	with	the	
British.	Moreover,	it	could	not	substantiate	its	allegations	and	challenge	the	Yugoslav	counter	
memorandum	without	using	the	information	provided	by	Tito	and	thus	revealing	its	contact	
with	 the	 Partisans.	 Various	 options	 were	 considered,	 including	 proposing	 to	 Tito	 an	
intervention	by	writing	 a	 letter	 to	 the	editor	 of	 a	 journal,	who	would	 invite	Mihailović	 to	
reply.36	But	in	the	end,	the	Soviets	decided	not	to	reply	at	all	and	on	25	January	1943	they	
issued	a	brief	note	merely	reaffirming	the	content	of	the	August	memorandum.37		
In	the	following	months,	while	Soviet	relations	with	Tito	were	punctuated	by	occasional	
disagreements	and	complicated	by	Tito’s	frustration	with	the	lack	of	Soviet	military	support,38	
																																																						
35	Radiogramma	General’nogo	Sekretariia	KPIu	 I.	Broz	Tito	 Ispolnitel’nogo	Komitetu	Kominterna,	12.11.1942,	
and	Radiogramma	General’nogo	Sekretariia	Ispolnitel’nogo	Komiteta	Kominterna	G.	Dimitrova	Generaln’nomy	
Sekretariu	KPIu	I.	Broz	Tito,	19.11.1942	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	149	and	154	and	Firsov,	Klehr,	
and	Haynes,	Secret	Cables	of	the	Comintern,	196-97.	
36	From	Lozovskii	to	Molotov,	29.8.1942,	in	AVP	RF,	f.	06,	o.	4,	p.	26,	f.	292	ll.	145-146.	
37	Pamiatnaia	Zapiska	NKID	SSSR	Iugoslavskoi	Missii	v	SSSR,	25.1.1943,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	
170.	
38	A	low	point	was	reached	in	March	1943,	when	Tito	notified	the	Soviets	that	he	had	established	contact	with	
the	Germans	to	exchange	prisoners,	adding	with	a	certain	pleasure	that	hatred	for	the	British	was	running	high	
among	the	people	of	Yugoslavia	because	they	refused	to	open	a	second	front	and	were	‘striving	to	weaken	the	
Soviet	Union’.	Radiogramma	General’novo	Sekretaria	KPIu	 I.	Broz	Tito	 Ispolnitel’nomu	Komitetu	Kominterna,	
30.3.1943,	 in	 ibid.,	 182.	 The	 Soviets	 were	 indignant	 and	 strongly	 reprimanded	 him.	 Dimitrov	 caustically	
suggested	to	Tito	that	the	interests	of	the	national	liberation	struggle	might	be	better	served	‘by	stirring	up	the	
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Moscow	seemed	to	be	unsure	as	to	whether	it	was	better	openly	to	support	the	Partisans,	
work	for	an	agreement	with	the	Chetniks,	or	simply	remain	steadfast	in	their	policy	of	denial.	
On	5	March	1943,	for	example,	the	British	government	asked	Moscow	for	support	in	getting	
in	touch	with	the	Partisans.39	Molotov’s	first	reaction	was,	as	usual,	to	deny	the	existence	of	
any	connections	with	Yugoslavia,40	but	then	he	pondered	over	whether	it	might	be	expedient	
to	present	a	more	articulate	reply.	The	several	different	drafts	of	his	response	which	were	
prepared	are	indicative	of	the	doubts	which	were	harboured	in	Moscow.		
A	first	version,	dated	31	March,	stated	that	the	Soviet	Union	considered	unification	of	all	
the	forces	which	were	fighting	against	the	Germans	to	be	of	utmost	importance.	The	draft	
also	 contained	 a	 cautious	 expression	 of	 support	 for	 the	 partisan	 movement	 ‘which	
encompassed	 the	 very	 broadest	 sectors	 of	 the	 population	 irrespective	 of	 political	
orientation’.	 However,	 the	 document	 continued,	 the	 Soviet	 government	 did	 not	 wish	 to	
interfere	in	internal	problems	that	needed	to	be	sorted	out	by	the	Yugoslav	government.	It	
denied	 that	 it	 was	 supporting	 the	 Partisans	 against	 Mihailović	 or	 producing	 propaganda	
against	him.	A	second	version	of	 the	document,	prepared	on	4	April,	dropped	 the	call	 for	
unification	 of	 the	 resistance	 forces	 and	 the	 claim	 that	 Soviet	 radio	 was	 not	 attacking	
Mihailović,	emphasizing	that	‘there	should	be	no	recrimination	in	the	British	and	Soviet	press	
and	radio,	either	against	Mihailović	or	the	Partisan’.	On	16	April,	it	was	decided	to	delay	the	
reply	and	indeed	it	was	never	sent.41	
In	 the	 meantime,	 British	 policy	 was	 shifting.	 British	 intelligence	 in	 Cairo	 seemed	
increasingly	convinced	that	the	Partisans	were	a	better	investment	from	a	military	point	of	
view,	and	started	lobbying	to	establish	liaisons	with	them.	In	March,	they	also	sent	their	first	
agent	to	Tito’s	headquarters.	Over	the	summer,	it	was	decided	to	support	both	groups	and	to	
send	them	two	high	ranking	missions	to	evaluate	the	situation	and	advise	on	policy.	Moscow	
remained	suspicious.	When,	in	May,	one	of	the	British	agents	despatched	to	his	headquarters	
																																																						
utmost	hatred	for	the	occupiers’	instead	of	‘encouraging	displeasure	with	the	English’.	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	
Georgi	Dimitrov,	1.4.1943,	267.	
39	 Memorandum	 Pravitel’stva	 Velikobritannii	 Pravitel’stvu	 SSSR,	 9.3.1943,	 in	 Otnosheniia	 Rossii	 (SSSR)	 s	
Iugoslaviei,	176-87.	
40	Telegramma	Posla	Iugoslavii	v	SSSR	S.	Simicha	v	Ministerstvo	Inostrannykh	del	Iugoslavskogo	Pravitel’stva	v	
Emigratsii,	20.3.1943,	in	ibid.,	181-82.	
41	The	various	drafts	are	in	AVP	RF,	f.	06,	o.	5,	p.	35,	f.	421,	ll.	9-16.	See	also	ibid.,	524.	
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asked	Tito	to	send	a	delegation	to	Cairo,	Stalin	himself	agreed	with	Dimitrov	that	the	request	
should	be	turned	down	on	the	grounds	that	everybody	was	busy	fighting	the	enemy.42		
	
Moscow’s	paralysis	 lifted	at	 the	end	of	1943,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 transition	 in	Soviet	
policy	 towards	 the	 entire	 communist	 movement.	 In	 May,	 Moscow	 had	 announced	 the	
disbandment	of	the	Comintern.	Although	this	move	is	generally	interpreted	as	an	attempt	to	
improve	relations	with	the	Western	Allies,	privately	Stalin	explained	that	it	was	also	designed	
to	enlarge	the	field	of	manoeuvre	of	the	communist	parties	which,	due	to	their	participation	
in	the	Comintern,	were	‘falsely	accused	of	supposedly	being	agents	of	a	foreign	state’.43	In	
June		it	was	decided	to	create	a	Department	of	International	Information,	a	sort	of	umbrella	
organization	 secretly	 headed	 by	Dimitrov	which	was	 in	 charge	 of	 “special	 institutes”	 that	
inherited	 the	 functions	 of	 the	 Comintern.44	What	 happened	 later,	 however,	 was	 a	much	
greater	change.	Although	the	institutes	were	created	immediately,	the	Department	that	was	
supposed	to	control	them	was	not,	and	its	functions	were	approved	only	in	September	1944.	
In	the	meantime,	the	institutes	apparently	operated	without	much	direction	from	the	centre,	
and	were	severally	handicapped	by	organizational	problems	and	by	the	fact	that	most	foreign	
cadres	were	going	back	to	their	own	countries.	Dimitrov,	who	in	any	case	had	to	take	frequent	
periods	 of	 leave	 due	 to	 illness,	 was	 progressively	 side-lined,	 while	 Stalin	 and	 Molotov	
personally	 directed	 the	 communist	 parties	 either	 through	 personal	 meetings	 with	 their	
leaders	or	through	the	missions	dispatched	by	Soviet	military	intelligence.	
In	 the	meantime,	 in	Yugoslavia	 the	pace	of	events	began	 to	accelerate.	Tito	had	good	
reason	to	think	that,	in	the	Western	field,	the	wind	was	changing	in	his	favour.	The	British,	he	
cabled	to	Dimitrov,	were	offering	help	‘now	that	we	have	almost	liquidated	Mihailović	and	
his	Chetniks’	and	it	was	necessary	to	accept	their	offer	of	material	aid	‘and	win	them	over	
politically’.45	 Tito’s	 impression	 that	 the	 standing	 of	 the	 Partisans	 was	 improving	 was	
confirmed	when	one	of	the	British	agents	told	him	that	in	Cairo	there	were	two	factions,	one	
																																																						
42	From	Dimitrov	to	Stalin,	24.5.1943,	in	Russian	State	Archive	of	Socio-Political	History	[RGASPI],	f.	495,	o.	74,	
d.	595,	l.	30.	Stalin’s	approval	is	clear	from	the	26	May	entry	in	Dimitrov’s	diary,	which	has	not	been	included	in	
the	English	translation	edited	by	I.	Banac	but	appears	in	the	Italian	edition.	
43	Banac	(ed.)	The	Diary	of	Georgi	Dimitrov,	21.5.1943,	276.		
44	On	the	creation	of	the	Department	of	International	information	M.M.	Narinskii	and	N.S.	Lebedeva,	‘Rospusk	
Kominterna	i	Sozdanie	Otdela	Mezhdunarodnoi	Informatsii	TsK	VKP(b).	Mai	1943	-	Mai	1945’,	in	A.	O.	Chubarʹian	
(ed.)	Istoriia	Kommunisticheskogo	Internatsionala.	1919-1943:	Dokumental'nie	Ocherki	(Moscow	2002),	227-53	
and	G.M.	Adibekov,	‘Komintern	posle	Formal'nogo	Rospuska	(1943	1944	gg.)’,	Voprosy	Istorii,	8	(1997),	28-41.		
45	From	Dimitrov	to	Tito,	16.5.1943,	in	RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1369,	ll.	25-26.	
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pro-Mihailović	 and	 one	 pro-Tito,	 but	 that	 the	 military	 circles	 were	 unhappy	 with	 British	
support	 for	 the	 former.	 Tito	quickly	 passed	 this	 information	 to	Dimitrov,	 adding	 that	 ‘the	
British	 ‘wants	 to	 know	 too	much	 about	 our	 army’	 but	 that	 he	was	 giving	 them	only	 ‘the	
information	that	we	think	can	be	given’.46	During	the	same	period,	Tito	pushed	neighbouring	
parties	to	take	a	more	aggressive	stand	against	their	internal	enemies.	In	August,	he	forced	
the	Albanian	communist	party	to	denounce	an	agreement	with	the	nationalists	of	the	Balli	
Kombëtar,	thus	escalating	the	confrontation	with	non-communist	groups.	At	the	same	time,	
he	extracted	from	the	Greek	communist	party	the	right	to	organize	a	Slav	National	Liberation	
Front	in	Greek	Macedonia,	which	soon	manifested	separatist	tendencies.	In	September,	he	
sharply	criticised	the	Greek	comrades	for	allowing	their	national	liberation	movement	to	fall	
under	 British	 influence.47	 Finally,	 on	 2	 October,	 Tito	 informed	 Dimitrov	 that	 he	 did	 not	
recognise	the	authority	of	the	government-in-exile	or	the	King,	that	he	did	not	intend	to	allow	
their	return	to	the	country,	and	that	the	AVNOJ	should	be	considered	the	only	legal	authority	
in	the	country.	Significantly	he	reported	that	he	had	communicated	his	intentions	to	Fitzroy	
Maclean,	Churchill’s	personal	envoy	to	the	Partisans,	and	that	Maclean	had	let	the	Partisans	
know	that	the	British	government	would	not	strongly	uphold	the	king	and	the	government-
in-exile.48	Although	the	telegram	was	widely	circulated	among	the	Soviet	leadership,	which	
had	strongly	discouraged	Tito	to	take	the	same	step	a	year	earlier,	this	time	Moscow	did	not	
react.	 Excluding	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 implications	 of	 this	 news	 had	 not	 been	 fully	
understood,	it	can	be	argued	that	Moscow	preferred	to	remain	on	the	fringe	of	the	action,	
keeping	a	free	hand	to	stop	Tito	if	his	gamble	backfired	or	to	support	him	in	case	of	success.	
Which,	in	the	end,	is	exactly	what	happened.	
The	Soviets’	silence,	in	any	case,	was	enough	for	Tito	to	start	preparing	a	new	conference	
of	the	AVNOJ	without	feeling	the	need	to	keep	them	updated	on	the	details.	At	the	same	
time,	Moscow	started	conducting	discreet	surveys	with	the	British.	At	the	end	of	October,	
meeting	with	Eden	in	Moscow,	Molotov	inquired	cautiously	about	the	possibility	of	sending	
																																																						
46	Radiogramma	I.	Broz	Tito	G.	Dimitrovu,	1.9.1943,	in	Otnosheniia	Rossii	(SSSR)	s	Iugoslaviei,	192-93.	
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a	Soviet	mission	to	the	Partisans	‘to	obtain	information’.49	But	when	Eden	endorsed	the	idea	
and	suggested	sending	a	Soviet	mission	to	the	Chetniks	as	well,	Molotov	simply	dropped	the	
proposal.50	At	the	same	meeting,	in	response	to	Eden’s	direct	question,	he	did	not	deny	that	
Moscow	had	wireless	communication	with	the	country.	He	added,	however,	that	it	‘gave	only	
a	 very	 limited	 and	 uncertain	 means	 of	 contact.’51	 A	 request	 from	 Manuil’skii	 to	 send	
substantial	military	help	to	Tito	now	that	the	military	situation	made	it	technically	possible	
was	also	kept	on	hold.	52	Moscow	was	clearly	waiting	to	see	how	the	situation	developed.		
The	 Soviets	 did	 not	 have	 to	wait	 long.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 November	 1943,	Maclean	
suggested	to	abandon	the	Chetniks,	who	were	considered	irremediably	compromised	by	the	
Germans,	and	to	give	full	support	to	Tito.	Churchill	embraced	the	idea	that	instead	of	trying	
to	reconcile	Tito	and	Mihailović,	it	was	better	to	embrace	the	former,	in	the	hope	of	gaining	
his	 confidence	 and	 leading	 him	 into	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	 king.	 At	 Tehran,	 the	 British	
informed	Moscow	that	they	intended	to	provide	military	support	to	Tito	and	dropped	their	
request	 for	assistance	 in	brokering	a	deal	between	him	and	Mihailović.	Soviet	 intelligence	
confirmed	 the	 British	 shift	 towards	 Tito,	 providing	 Moscow	 with	 London’s	 confidential	
documents	on	the	matter.53	The	question	of	the	Soviet	mission	was	discussed	again.	Since	the	
meeting	 in	Moscow	 in	 October,	 however,	 positions	 had	 been	 reversed.	 This	 time	 it	 was	
Molotov	who	asked	Eden	‘if	he	thinks	that	we	should	send	a	mission	also	to	Mihailović’,	and	
it	was	the	British	foreign	minister	who	raised	objections	based	both	on	technical	reasons	and	
on	the	fact	that	they	were	about	to	abandon	the	chief	of	the	Chetniks.54	Already	on	his	way	
back	 from	 the	 conference,	 Stalin	 instructed	 the	 chief	 of	 Soviet	 aviation	 to	 support	 the	
Partisans	‘whatever	it	takes’.55	
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Tito,	in	the	meantime,	made	his	move.	On	29	November,	the	AVNOJ	established	itself	as	
the	provisional	government	of	 the	country	and	declared	that	the	king	could	not	enter	the	
country	until	 it	had	been	liberated	and	a	referendum	held	on	the	monarchy.56	Apparently,	
Stalin	reacted	angrily	to	the	news,	commenting	that	it	was	‘a	stab	in	the	back	for	the	Soviet	
Union	and	the	Teheran	decisions’.57	Even	if	this	was	the	case,	Stalin	quickly	changed	his	tune	
once	it	was	clear	that	the	Western	allies	did	not	view	this	development	in	a	negative	light.	On	
12	December,	the	proposal	for	military	supplies	to	Tito	put	forward	in	October	by	Manuil’skii	
was	finally	approved.	On	13	December,	the	British	wrote	to	Moscow	informing	them	that	they	
did	not	consider	the	results	of	the	AVNOJ	conference	would	affect	their	Yugoslav	policy	or	
relations	 with	 the	 partisans,	 and	 asked	 for	 Soviet	 assistance	 in	 brokering	 an	 agreement	
between	Tito	and	the	king.58	The	following	day	the	Soviet	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	issued	a	
note	praising	the	AVNOJ’s	decisions.	The	wording	of	the	note	made	it	clear	that	the	new	policy	
had	 originated	 in	 the	Western	 field,	 and	 that	Moscow	was	merely	 following	 up	 a	 British	
initiative.	The	crucial	passage,	which	was	rewritten	several	times,	stated	that	the	events	in	
Yugoslavia	had	‘already	met	sympathetic	responses	in	the	United	Kingdom	and	in	the	US’	and	
in	 announcing	 the	 arrival	 of	 a	 Soviet	Mission	 it	was	 stressed	 that	 the	 British	 had	 already	
established	their	mission	in	the	field.59	The	Soviet	reply	to	the	British	note	of	13	December	
was	also	carefully	worded	to	keep	the	Soviets’	hands	free.	Assurances	that	the	Soviet	mission	
would	 facilitate	 cooperation	between	Tito	 and	 the	 king	 contained	 in	 the	 first	draft	of	 the	
response	were	dropped	in	the	final	version.	In	the	end,	Molotov	simply	stated	that,	although	
there	appeared	to	be	many	obstacles,	the	Soviet	government	was	 ‘ready	to	do	everything	
possible	for	the	achievement	of	a	compromise’.60	The	last	piece	of	the	new	Soviet	policy	was	
put	 in	 place	 on	 22	 December,	 when	 the	 government	 in	 Moscow	 communicated	 to	 the	
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Yugoslav	government-in-exile	that	 it	was	not	ready	to	sign	the	new	friendship	and	mutual	
assistance	pact	that	had	been	under	discussion	since	1942.61		
In	the	following	days,	Moscow	proved	to	be	more	than	happy	to	leave	the	British	out	in	
the	cold:	when	Eden	asked	Molotov	if	the	Soviet	government	had	any	suggestions	as	to	how	
to	achieve	the	political	compromise,	he	replied	that	unfortunately	Moscow	had	not	received	
enough	information	about	the	situation	on	the	ground	to	make	specific	recommendations.62	
Meanwhile,	Dimitrov	instructed	Tito	as	to	how	he	should	reply	to	the	question	posed	by	the	
Western	 Allies	 to	 the	 Yugoslav	 delegation	 that	 was	 sent	 to	 Cairo	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	
December.	 Dimitrov	 agreed	 with	 Tito	 that	 he	 should	 not	 push	 for	 recognition	 of	 the	
committee	by	the	Western	Allies	and	that	he	should	remain	firm	in	his	demand	to	postpone	
the	issue	of	the	position	of	the	king	until	after	the	war.	On	the	issue	of	propaganda	against	
the	 king,	 he	 suggested	 that	 Tito	 show	 ‘the	 necessary	 flexibility’	 in	 order	 to	 ‘better	
[disorganize]	his	supporters	abroad	and	in	Serbia’	and	overcome	‘certain	difficulties	on	the	
part	of	the	Anglo-Americans	in	their	aid	to	the	People’s	Liberation	Army’.	Tito,	for	example,	
could	declare	that	‘if	the	king	will	not	oppose	the	national	committee,	the	latter	will	for	its	
part	refrain	from	all	propaganda	against	the	king’.	Above	all,	it	was	necessary	to	avoid	giving	
the	impression	that	he	was	favouring	the	Croats	over	the	Serbs.63		
	
At	the	beginning	of	1944,	the	Soviets	continued	to	claim	that	they	did	not	have	enough	
information	about	the	situation	in	Yugoslavia	to	take	any	action,	and	under	this	pretext	they	
refused	to	issue	a	declaration	advocating	an	agreement	between	Tito	and	the	king.64	Behind	
the	 scenes,	 they	were	 overturning	 one	 of	 the	 key	 features	 of	 the	 popular	 front	 strategy	
established	 in	 1941,	 suggesting	 to	 Tito	 that	 he	 reject	 any	 agreement	 with	 the	 Yugoslav	
government-in-exile.	It	was	Churchill	who	took	the	initiative,	asking	Tito,	on	5	February,	if	the	
dismissal	of	Mihailović	could	open	up	the	possibility	of	an	agreement	between	the	Partisans	
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and	the	king.	Tito	forwarded	the	letter	to	Dimitrov,	pointing	out	that	although	he	had	plenty	
of	 reasons	 to	 refuse	 the	deal	 the	matter	was	 serious	 enough	 to	 ask	 the	opinion	of	 Stalin	
himself.65	Tito,	who	was	used	to	being	reprimanded	by	Moscow	over	his	direct	confrontations	
with	 the	 Government-in-exile,	 this	 time	 received	 a	 different	 response.	 Though	 Dimitrov,	
Stalin	and	Molotov	let	him	know	that	he	should	reply	to	‘the	Englishman’	that	he	too	favoured	
the	 unity	 of	 the	 Yugoslavs	 and	 that,	 for	 this	 reason,	 the	 government-in-exile,	 including	
Mihailović,	should	be	eliminated,	the	AVNOJ	recognized	as	the	sole	government	of	Yugoslavia	
and	 the	king	 submitted	 to	 its	 law.	 If	 the	king	was	willing	 to	accept	 these	 conditions,	 they	
stated,	the	AVNOJ	would	not	object	to	cooperating	with	him,	but	of	course	the	ultimate	fate	
of	the	monarchy	would	only	be	decided	after	the	end	of	the	war.	Tito	was	also	instructed	to	
refer	to	Stalin	in	the	subsequent	telegrams	as	to	‘the	friend’66		
Tito	wrote	 his	 reply	 to	 Churchill	 on	 9	 February,	 using	 the	wording	 of	 the	 text	 he	 had	
received	from	the	Kremlin.67	Apparently,	when	the	British	Ambassador	in	Moscow	showed	
the	messages	exchanged	between	Tito	and	Churchill	to	Molotov,	the	Soviet	foreign	minister	
commented	along	the	 lines	that	they	 ‘had	not	advanced	things	much’.68	British	policy	had	
reached	an	 impasse.	Lacking	a	political	solution,	 it	was	clear	 to	everybody	that	 the	crucial	
factor	 for	 the	 future	of	Yugoslavia	was	 the	balance	of	 forces	 in	 the	 field	and	especially	 in	
Serbia	where	Mihailović	was	still	strong	and	the	Partisans	did	not	have	a	significant	presence.		
At	 the	 end	 of	 February,	 the	 possibility	 of	 Soviet	 action	 in	 Yugoslavia	 substantially	
increased	with	the	arrival	of	the	Soviet	military	mission.	The	mission,	led	by	the	Lieutenant-
General	of	the	military	intelligence,	Nikolai	Korneev,	was	composed	of	21	members,	including	
at	 least	 two	members	of	 the	KGB,	whose	 task	was	 to	 report,	 among	other	 things,	on	 the	
intentions	 of	 the	 British	 and	 the	 Americans	 in	 Yugoslavia.	 At	 Tito’s	 request,	 in	 April	 an	
additional	group	of	KGB	agents	was	dispatched	to	train	the	partisans	in	the	intelligence	field.69	
In	 the	 following	months,	 the	ranks	of	 the	mission	were	 further	 increased,	and	by	October	
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1944	it	numbered	94	members,	including	32	medical	personnel.70	The	importance	attached	
to	the	mission	by	the	Soviets	was	also	reflected	in	the	rank	of	Korneev,	a	Lieutenant-General,	
who	outranked	 both	 the	 heads	 of	 the	 British	 and	 the	American	missions	 attached	 to	 the	
partisans.71			
Officially,	the	mission	was	there	only	to	gather	information	on	the	country.72	It	did	much	
more	than	this.	Firstly,	the	mission,	which	reported	directly	to	Molotov,	created	for	the	first	
time	 a	 direct	 channel	 of	 communication	 between	 Tito	 and	 the	 Soviet	 leadership	 when	
Moscow	wanted	to	be	sure	that	the	situation	was	developing	in	line	with	its	foreign	policy.			
Completing	the	process	of	side-lining	Dimitrov	which	had	started	with	the	disbandment	
of	 the	 Comintern,	 Tito	was	 informed	 that	 from	April	 he	 could	 communicate	 directly	with	
Molotov,	 and	 that	 Dimitrov	 would	 have	 nothing	 more	 to	 do	 with	 Yugoslavia.	 Soviet	
correspondence	with	Tito	shows	that	starting	from	1944	the	Soviet	leadership	was	not	only	
concerned	to	reassure	the	Western	Allies,	but	also	to	reassure	Tito,	who	was	clearly	emerging	
as	the	master	of	post-war	Yugoslavia.	In	the	same	letter	which	confirmed	the	marginalization	
of	Dimitrov,	Stalin	and	Molotov	personally	assured	Tito	that	they	considered	Yugoslavia	an	
ally	of	the	Soviet	Union,	and	Bulgaria	an	enemy,	and	that	even	 if	 the	situation	changed	 in	
Bulgaria	they	wanted	Yugoslavia	to	be	their	‘principal	support	in	South-eastern	Europe’.	The	
two	 leaders	 added	 that	 they	 had	 no	 plans	 for	 the	 ‘sovietisation’	 of	 either	 Yugoslavia	 or	
Bulgaria,	which	they	characterised	as	democratic	countries	allied	with	the	Soviet	Union,	and	
that	whatever	Dimitrov	was	thinking,	any	decision	on	the	question	of	Macedonia	would	be	
taken	with	Tito’s	agreement.73	From	April	1944	onwards,	the	tone	of	Soviet	correspondence	
with	Tito	changed	significantly.	While	Dimitrov	had	addressed	Tito	as	a	subordinate,	Molotov	
generally	expressed	himself	in	terms	of	giving	advice	rather	than	directives.	In	June,	Korneev	
was	also	reminded	that	he	should	make	suggestions	to	Tito	only	when	he	was	asked	to	do	so,	
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and	that	he	should	not	overwhelm	him	with	questions	‘especially	when	he	shows	no	desire	
to	express	an	opinion’.74	
Besides	establishing	a	political	connection,	the	second	task	of	the	mission	was	to	create	
the	conditions	for	the	delivery	of	a	vital	military	supply	to	the	Partisan	army.	On	4	March,	
Molotov	guaranteed	that	as	soon	as	this	was	technically	possible,	Moscow	would	send	anti-
tank	cannons,	anti-aircraft	machine	guns,	ammunition,	food,	radio	sets,	typewriters,	cinema	
projectors	with	movies,	cameras	‘and	also	Soviet	literature’.	Only	with	the	provision	of	anti-
aircraft	weapons	did	there	seem	to	be	difficulties,	but	Molotov	promised	a	further	reply	on	
this	matter	 ‘within	 two	 days’.	Molotov	 also	 assured	 Tito	 that	 he	would	 provide	 him	with	
experts	in	intelligence,	counterintelligence,	and	cipher	communications,	as	well	as	financial	
experts.	Tito’s	request	for	two	Soviet	officers	to	be	posted	in	each	of	the	Yugoslav	corps	was	
also	approved,	as	well	as	the	dispatch	of	a	Yugoslav	mission	to	Moscow.75	Moscow	clearly	felt	
a	sense	of	urgency,	especially	after	Tito	suggested	that	the	British	were	not	supporting	his	
divisions	in	western	Serbia	because	they	were	also	fighting	against	Mihailović.	In	mid-March,	
Molotov	noted	that	it	was	necessary	to	do	‘everything	possible’	to	help	them.76	The	Yugoslav	
mission	to	the	Soviet	Union	arrived	in	Moscow	in	April.	It	included	Milovan	Djilas,	who	was	
one	of	the	key	members	of	Tito’s	staff.	
The	delivery	of	military	supplies	to	Yugoslavia,	however,	was	more	problematic	than	both	
the	Soviets	and	 the	partisans	had	hoped	and	expected,	and	certainly	did	not	 immediately	
result	in	a	partisan	breakthrough	in	Serbia.	At	the	end	of	April,	Manuil’skii	informed	Molotov	
that	with	only	six	aircraft	deployed	for	this	purpose,	it	had	not	been	possible	to	deliver	even	
the	 small	 load	 of	 essential	 supplies	 assembled	 in	 Kiev.77	 The	 Soviet	 Air	 Force	 justified	 its	
actions,	claiming	that	bad	weather,	lack	of	aircraft,	and	excessive	distance	from	the	dropping	
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intelligence	Ivan	Il’ichev	sharply	attacked	Korneev,	claiming	that	although	at	the	end	of	October	he	had	been	
instructed	to	act	otherwise	by	Molotov,	he	was	maintaining	an	obliging	attitude	towards	Tito,	and	had	turned	
the	mission	 ‘in	a	 sort	of	appendage’	of	 the	Yugoslav	headquarters.	 From	 Il’ichev	 to	Molotov,	23.11.1944,	 in	
RGASPI,	f	82,	o.	2,	d.	1373,	ll.	1-2.	Korneev	was	eventually	replaced	by	Major	General	Anisim	Kiselev.	It	is	also	
possible	that	Il’ichev	resented	that	fact	that	Korneev	reported	to	Molotov	and	not	to	him.	
75	From	Alekseev	[Molotov]	to	Korneev,	4.3.1944,	in	RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1369,	l.	82.		
76	Handwritten	note	on	Rasshifrovannia	Telegramma	iz	Iugoslavii,	17.3.1944,	in	RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1369,	l.	97.	
77	Dokladnaia	Zapisca	D.Z.	Manuil’skogo	Zamestiteliu	Predsedatelia	Sovnarkoma	SSSR	ob	Okazanii	Pomoshchi	
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Armiia	v	Stranakh	Tsentral'noi,	Severnoi	Evropy.	Dokumenty	i	Materialy.	1944-1945,	192-94.	
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points	were	the	primary	reasons	for	the	poor	results.	Apparently,	lack	of	coordination	with	
the	Soviet	mission	was	also	to	blame:	as	one	officer	who	was	responsible	for	organizing	the	
operations	 claimed,	 Korneev	 had	 an	 inadequate	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 delivery	 of	
supplies	worked,	and	had	submitted	a	plan	with	dropping	points	extending	across	500	km,	
‘which	would	be	across	the	entire	country’.78	In	one	instance,	a	plane	had	been	accidentally	
downed	 by	 Soviet	 friendly	 fire.79	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	May,	 the	 State	 Defense	 Committee	
approved	the	allocation	of	additional	crews	for	the	delivery	of	supplies	and	the	establishment	
of	another	base	in	the	Ukrainian	region	of	Vinnytsia.	Efforts	were	also	intensified	to	obtain	
permission	from	the	Western	Allies	to	operate	Soviet	planes	out	of	their	base	 in	southern	
Italy,	and	the	situation	slowly	improved.	Between	May	and	July,	according	to	the	Korneev’s	
report,	 Soviet	 planes	 delivered	 over	 220	 tons	 of	 material,	 including	 around	 150	 tons	 of	
military	equipment,	to	Yugoslavia.80			
	
While	doing	their	best	 to	help	the	Partisans,	Molotov	and	Stalin	remained	determined	
that	Tito’s	increasing	hold	over	the	country	did	not	appear	to	be	orchestrated	by	Moscow.	
KGB	officers	attached	to	the	mission	were	instructed	to	keep	a	low	profile	and	demonstrate	
‘extreme	 caution	 and	 tact	 so	 as	 not	 to	 provoke	 complains	 that	we	 are	 interfering	 in	 the	
internal	 affairs	 of	 Yugoslavia	 or	 that	 we	 are	 not	 loyal	 to	 the	 allies’.81	 The	 same	 caution	
encouraged	Moscow	to	reject	the	option	to	sever	relations	with	the	Yugoslav	government-in-
exile,	which	had	been	contemplated	in	the	first	months	of	the	year.82	In	April,	meeting	Djilas	
in	 Moscow,	 Molotov	 guaranteed	 that	 the	 Soviet	 government	 intended	 to	 recognize	 the	
AVNOJ	as	the	legitimate	government	of	Yugoslavia,	but	he	also	made	it	clear	that	this	step	
was	premature	and	that	it	should	be	done	with	consideration	for	relations	with	the	Western	
Allies	and	the	situation	in	other	countries.	Although	Djilas	was	pushing	for	a	quick	solution,	
both	he	and	Molotov	agreed	that	international	recognition	depended	on	the	capacity	of	Tito	
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79	Edemskii,	‘Moskva	i	Antifashistskoe	Dvizhenie	I.	Broz	Tito’,	106-7.	
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Period	s	4	Maia	po	1	Avgusta,	in	RGASPI,	f.	82,	o.	2,	d.	1731,	ll.	37-39.	
81	Quoted	in	Edemskii,	‘Moskva	i	Antifashistskoe	Dvizhenie	I.	Broz	Tito’,	105.	
82	Drafts	of	the	letters	directed	to	the	Yugoslav	Prime	Minister	and	dated	30.1.1944	and	12.3.1944	in	AVP	RF,	f.	
06,	o.	6,	p.	57,	d.	791,	ll.	1-6.	
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to	strengthen	his	position	in	Serbia.83	As	was	often	the	case	when	Moscow	wanted	to	send	a	
signal	without	making	an	official	commitment,	the	question	of	political	recognition	for	the	
AVNOJ	by	the	Soviet	government	was	repeatedly	posed	by	the	Soviet	press	in	the	weeks	that	
followed.84		
The	Western	Allies	remained	a	continuous	source	of	concern.	Tito	and	the	Soviets	became	
increasingly	suspicious	that,	notwithstanding	Churchill’s	public	statements,	the	British	were	
still	 surreptitiously	 supporting	 Mihailović	 in	 the	 hope	 of	 turning	 his	 forces	 against	 the	
Partisans.85	By	the	beginning	of	June,	Stalin	was	also	convinced	that	the	British	were	plotting	
to	kill	Tito.	When	he	barely	survived	a	surprise	attack	by	the	Germans	and	was	evacuated	to	
Bari,	Stalin	summoned	Djilas	and	asked	him	to	warn	Tito	to	be	‘wary	of	our	“foreign	friends”’	
and	keep	the	details	of	his	return	trip	strictly	secret.	‘Do	not	forget	that	there	are	cases	where	
planes	break	down	in	the	air’,	he	said,	in	an	apparent	reference	to	the	rumours	that	the	death	
in	a	flying	accident	of	the	Polish	general	Sikorski	had	been	orchestrated	by	London.86	Tito,	as	
Stalin	 explained	 to	 Djilas,	 had	 to	 strengthen	 his	 security	 measures,	 creating	 a	 fake	
headquarters	where	he	could	invite	the	members	of	the	foreign	missions	but	where	nothing	
of	significance	would	actually	be	discussed.	Real	decisions	were	to	be	taken	instead	at	a	secret	
headquarters,	whose	existence	was	to	remain	unknown.	It	would	be	even	better,	he	argued,	
to	create	a	third	headquarters,	which	would	assume	control	over	operations	in	the	event	that	
the	real	headquarters	was	compromised.	Tito	was	also	to	find	a	way	to	reduce	the	number	of	
Western	agents	attached	to	his	troops,	for	example	by	telling	the	British	that	if	they	did	not	
reduce	their	staff,	he	would	be	forced	to	agree	to	an	 increase	 in	Soviet	agents.	Of	course,	
Soviet	agents	could	remain	with	Tito	pretending	that	they	were	part	of	the	Yugoslav	army.	
Finally,	Stalin	suggested,	Tito	needed	to	find	a	way	temporarily	to	fake	good	relations	with	
King	Peter	‘to	foster	the	appearance	of	cooperation	with	those	who	control	him	and	make	
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them	 stop	 harming	 AVNOJ’.	 This	 was	 necessary	 ‘to	 strengthen	 relations	 with	 the	 broad	
sectors	of	the	population	in	Yugoslavia	and,	in	particular,	in	Serbia’.87		
Djilas	proved	sceptical	about	the	possibility	of	an	agreement	with	the	King,	but	in	the	end	
the	situation	developed	as	the	Soviet	leader	had	hoped.	When,	at	the	beginning	of	June	1944,	
Tito	established	his	headquarters	on	the	island	of	Vis	to	escape	German	pressure,	the	British	
found	 the	 occasion	 propitious	 for	 a	meeting	with	 the	 new	 Yugoslav	 prime	minister,	 Ivan		
Šubašić.	Molotov	was	informed	by	the	British	of	the	meeting,	but	before	replying	rushed	to	
ask	 Tito’s	 opinion	 and	 plans.	 Then,	 he	 put	 all	Moscow’s	might	 into	 the	 negotiations	 and	
handed	 to	 Korneev	 a	 letter	 addressed	 to	 Šubašić,	 in	 which	 they	 promised	 to	 support	 a	
government	 formed	 in	 agreement	with	 Tito	 and	which	 unified	 the	 various	 forces	 against	
traitors	of	the	people	‘such	as	Pavelić,	Nedić	and	Mihailović’88.	They	also	promised	substantial	
financial	help,89	and	warned	Tito	that	that	the	presence	of	the	Soviet	mission	in	Yugoslavia	
might	arouse	British	suspicions	and	therefore	worsen	their	relations	with	Tito.	If	at	any	point	
Tito	began	to	think	that	this	was	the	case,	Moscow	was	ready	to	reduce	the	size	of	the	mission	
leaving	 behind	 only	 a	 few	minor	 figures.90	 The	 agreement	 between	 Tito	 and	 Šubašić	was	
signed	on	16	June.	The	AVNOJ	was	recognized	as	the	only	legitimate	government	in	Yugoslavia	
and	Šubašić	agreed	to	form	his	new	administration	without	those	elements	compromised	by	
the	German	occupation.	The	question	of	the	monarchy	was	postponed	until	the	end	of	the	
war.		
The	signing	of	 the	pact	did	not	ease	Moscow’s	concern.	The	KGB,	which	 intercepted	a	
report	by	Churchill	on	this	matter,	 informed	Stalin	that	neither	the	Prime	Minister	nor	the	
British	Foreign	Office	was	fully	satisfied,	and	that	the	conservative	circles	in	the	British	Foreign	
Office	were	working	against	Tito,	claiming	that	he	did	not	have	enough	support	in	Serbia.	In	
his	report	to	Stalin,	Korneev	sounded	similarly	alarmed	notes,	claiming	that	British	support	to	
the	Partisans	was	more	fictitious	than	real,	that	the	British	had	not	really	broken	off	relations	
with	Mihailović	and	that	they	were	secretly	mobilizing	all	their	reactionary	forces	to	oppose	
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the	Partisan	army	in	the	event	of	a	German	withdrawal.91	The	British,	who	had	cultivated	the	
illusion	of	having	tied	Tito	to	an	agreement	for	the	restoration	of	the	monarchy,	were	indeed	
disappointed,	sensing	that	they	were	just	giving	Tito	what	he	wanted	without	any	reasonable	
concessions	on	his	side.92	But	as	Eden	had	commented	at	the	beginning	of	June,	the	British	
only	had	themselves	to	blame	for	this	situation,	as	‘the	Russians	have	merely	sat	back	and	
watched	us	doing	their	work	for	them’.93	At	the	same	time,	the	Foreign	Office	vetoed	a	SOE	
plan	to	re-establish	connections	with	Mihailović	out	of	fear	of	losing	Tito’s	confidence,	and	
for	 the	 same	 reasons	 the	 British	 also	 forced	 the	 Americans	 to	 withdraw	 the	 intelligence	
mission	they	still	maintained	with	the	Chetniks.94		
Tito	considered	the	agreement	with	Šubašić	exactly	for	what	it	was:	an	expedient	to	gain	
time,	maintain	good	relations	with	the	Allies	and	strengthen	his	position.	Accordingly,	at	the	
beginning	of	July	he	wrote	to	Molotov	and	Stalin	that	he	intended	to	delay	the	formation	of	
the	government	‘because	this	would	give	us	time	to	strengthen	our	position	in	Serbia’.95	
In	August,	Tito	gave	further	guarantees	that	he	did	not	intend	to	establish	a	communist	
regime	in	the	country.	At	the	same	time,	he	asked	Stalin	through	Korneev	‘to	shield	us	from	
the	pressure	 from	the	British’,	who	were	plotting	with	Mihailović	 to	 strip	Serbia	 from	the	
AVNOJ.	Tito	also	asked	for	the	Red	Army	to	advance	through	Romania	into	south	and	central	
Serbia	 to	 participate	with	 the	 Partisan	 divisions	 assisting	 in	 the	 liberation	 of	 Belgrade.	 In	
September,	he	reiterated	the	demand	directly	to	Moscow,	where	at	his	own	request	he	had	
flown	 to	meet	 Stalin	 in	 secret.	 These	measures,	 he	 argued,	 ‘will	 resolve	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
Balkans’.96		
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Soviet	 troops	 entered	 Yugoslavia	 at	 the	 end	 of	 September	 under	 orders	 to	 fight	 the	
Germans	and	the	‘reactionary	forces	of	Yugoslavia	of	Nedić	and	Mihailović’.97	The	Soviets	did	
not	 inform	 the	 Western	 Allies	 of	 Tito’s	 request	 and	 only	 notified	 the	 British	 and	 US	
ambassadors	that	they	had	asked	permission	from	the	AVNOJ	to	temporarily	cross	the	border	
to	carry	on	operations	against	the	Germans.	In	the	way,	they	demonstrated	that	that	they	
considered	the	committee	to	be	the	only	legitimate	power	in	the	country	and	also	avoided	
the	creation	of	a	precedent	for	the	entrance	of	Western	troops.98	The	arrival	of	the	Red	Army	
was	coupled	with	a	peak	in	Soviet	supplies	reaching	the	AVNOJ,	which	was	made	possible	by,	
among	other	things,	the	use	of	airfields	in	the	Romanian	territory	and	in	Bari.99	At	this	point,	
Tito	felt	strong	enough	to	fulfil	the	promise	of	creating	a	new	government	and	summoned	
Šubašić	 to	 Yugoslavia.	 As	with	 the	 agreement	 signed	 in	 June,	 this	 new	pact	 reflected	 the	
balance	of	powers	in	the	country:	the	king	was	to	appoint	a	council	of	three	regents	proposed	
by	the	AVNOJ	to	represent	him	before	a	plebiscite	could	be	held,	and	the	regents	were	to	put	
in	place	a	new	government	which	would	be	totally	dominated	by	the	AVNOJ.	Tito	was	now	
the	master	of	Yugoslavia.		
	
The	Yugoslav	case	suggests	that,	in	the	context	of	the	shifting	balance	of	forces	amongst	
the	 Western	 Allies,	 Moscow	 was	 ready	 to	 put	 aside	 the	 popular	 front	 strategy	 and	 to	
encourage	local	communists	to	challenge	the	political	order	supported	by	the	British	and	the	
Americans	whilst	the	Second	World	War	was	still	raging.	The	modification	of	Soviet	policy	in	
1944	also	has	the	potential	retrospectively	to	shed	 light	on	the	earlier	period,	highlighting	
that	 the	disagreement	with	 the	Yugoslavs	over	 the	nature	of	 the	war	 in	1941-1943	never	
really	brought	into	question	the	Soviets’	recognition	of	the	preeminent	role	played	by	Tito	
amongst	 the	neighbour	parties.	The	example	of	Yugoslavia,	however,	also	shows	 that	 this	
apparently	 clear	 strategy	 covered	 deep	 uncertainties	 on	 the	 Soviet	 side	 as	 to	 the	 real	
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intentions	of	the	British,	the	real	space	of	manoeuvre	enjoyed	by	Moscow	and	the	way	 in	
which	 relations	with	 a	 new	 communist	 state	 in	 the	making	 should	 be	 established.	 It	 also	
shows	that,	trapped	in	the	Marxist	world-view	which	postulated	the	incompatibility	of	the	
socialist	and	capitalist	worlds,	Moscow	was	often	unable	to	understand	its	opponents,	looking	
for	conspiracies	where	they	did	not	exist.		
In	 the	 short	 term	 Soviet	 policy	 appeared	 successful.	 By	 directing	 Tito	 to	 abandon	 his	
radical	stance	and	adopt	the	slogan	of	national	 liberation,	Moscow	helped	him	to	gain	the	
confidence	of	the	British,	establishing	the	impression	a	collaboration	between	the	Partisans	
and	the	King	was	indeed	possible.	Then	the	Soviets	were	able	to	support	the	communist	take-
over	of	the	country	without	it	affecting	their	relations	with	the	Western	Allies.	Tito’s	flight	to	
Moscow	was	a	brutal	awakening	for	Churchill,	who	only	then	realized	that	in	Tito	the	British	
had	 ‘nursed	a	 viper’.100	 The	Soviets	were	also	able	 convincingly	 to	deny	until	 the	end	 the	
extent	of	their	involvement	with	the	Yugoslav	communist	movement,	thus	avoiding	the	risk	
that,	if	anything	went	wrong,	the	situation	could	be	ascribed	to	them.	In	all	this,	they	provided	
at	the	crucial	moment	the	military,	financial	and	diplomatic	support	that	the	Partisans	needed	
to	defeat	their	internal	enemies	and	to	gain	credibility	in	the	international	area.	Tito	played	
his	cards	well,	paying	lip	service	to	the	Soviets	when	needed	and	continuing	to	advance	his	
cause	step	by	step	whilst	maintaining	their	support.		
The	seeds	for	further	conflicts,	however,	had	been	planted.	Paradoxically,	by	pushing	Tito	
to	widen	his	popular	base	in	Yugoslavia	after	1942,	the	Soviets	had	established	him	as	the	
leader	of	a	communist	state	that	was	now	challenging	Moscow’s	supremacy.	Created	by	Stalin	
and	nursed	by	Churchill,	‘the	viper’	Tito	was	now	ready	to	bite	eastward.	Exacerbated	by	Tito’s	
attempt	to	impose	his	leadership	on	the	other	‘popular	democracies’	in	the	Balkans	after	the	
war,	the	conflict	between	the	two	leaders	of	the	communist	movements	eventually	became	
unmanageable,	and	in	1948	led	to	the	most	serious	split	in	the	communist	world.	
	
																																																						
100	From	Churchill	to	Eden,	19.12.1944,	in	NA,	CAB	120/729.	
